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AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS IN THE WTO DSM: GOOD OR BAD NEWS FOR NON-STATE ACTOR 
INVOLVEMENT? 
Forthcoming in World Trade Review 
Theresa Squatrito 
Abstract: Since 1998, non-state actors have had access to submit an “amicus curiae” brief to 
the WTO DSM. Like other forms of non-state actor involvement in the WTO, amicus curiae 
access has been controversial.  Despite this controversy, non-state actors have made use of 
this access and submitted amicus curiae briefs. This article asks: what has come of these 
briefs once they are submitted and what explains how amicus are treated by the DSM? This 
article empirically maps amici in all disputes from 1998 (after amicus access was first 
recognized) through 2014, arguing that amicus access is conditioned by a combination of 
political and legal constraints faced by the WTO panels and AB. In particular, whether the 
content of an amicus is considered hinges on it having the endorsement of a disputing party 
and whether its consideration interferes with the WTO DSM’s reputation for coherence. In all, 
these findings have implications for the debate over whether amicus curiae access is good 
new or bad news for the WTO and non-state actor involvement.   
 
Introduction 
The involvement of non-state actors in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) has been a 
controversial issue. Policy-makers and scholars have since the late 1990s disputed the merits 
and shortcomings of granting access to the WTO for non-state actors (Scholte, O'Brien, and 
Williams 1999, Charnovitz 2000, Van den Bossche 2008). Proponents of access herald it as a 
means of enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of decision-making. On the other hand, 
opponents of non-state actors’ involvement contend that it enables the undue influence of 
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special interests and undermines efficient decision-making. The issue of non-state actors’ 
involvement in the WTO extends to all corners of the WTO, including the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM). Since 1998, non-state actors have been formally allowed 
access to submit an “amicus curiae” brief to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. As with 
other forms of non-state actor access to the WTO, access to the DSM has been contentious. 
Against this backdrop, amicus access has been available to non-state actors for over fifteen 
years, and non-state actors have made use of this access and submitted amicus curiae briefs.  
What comes of these briefs once they are submitted: are they all accepted and then their 
content taken into consideration by the WTO DSM in deliberation and decision-making, or is 
this access conditional? What explains how amicus are treated by the DSM? This article seeks 
to answer these questions.  
An empirical examination of amicus curiae submissions to the WTO DSM and how 
the WTO DSM treats the amicus submissions sheds light on the merits and shortcomings of 
non-state actors’ access to the WTO DSM. This article’s contribution to the ongoing debates 
on the involvement of non-state actors in the WTO is twofold. First, the article provides an 
empirical contribution by mapping non-state actors’ participation in the WTO DSM as amici 
in all disputes from 1998 (after amicus access was first recognized) through 2014. While there 
has been recent research that has explored participation in the WTO Ministerial Conferences 
(Hanegraaff, Beyers, and Braun 2011, Hanegraaff et al. 2015), similar systematic empirical 
research on amicus curiae submissions has not been carried out. This article fills this gap, 
mapping all amicus submission from 1998 to 2014. Second, the article makes a theoretical 
contribution, arguing that amicus curiae access is conditional. While most of the debate 
regarding amici largely rest on the assumption that once an amicus is filed its substantive 
content will be considered and factored into deliberation and decision-making, this article 
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shows that additional factors condition access to the WTO DSM. Showing that amicus curiae 
access is conditional has implications for understanding their consequences. 
This article reveals that amicus curiae submissions, contrary to some expectations, 
have not flooded the WTO DSM. In fact, amicus curiae submissions have been received in 
only a minority of disputes. Additionally, this article shows access as an amicus is conditional 
– not all amicus briefs that are received are considered in the deliberation and decision-
making of the WTO panels and Appellate Body (AB). I argue that whether an amicus is 
considered is shaped by the DSM’s political and legal constraints. Specifically, two factors 
condition whether their content is taken into consideration by the panels and AB. First, the 
DSM only considers amicus submissions that are endorsed by a disputing party. Second, the 
DSM accepts and considers amicus only if they can secure the WTO DSM’s reputation for 
coherence. As a result of these two factors, amicus curiae access is conditional and therefore 
not all amicus curiae submissions translate into meaningful participation in the WTO DSM. 
 The article is organized in four parts. The first part provides an empirical mapping of 
amicus curiae submissions to the WTO DSM. The second part develops a theoretical account 
to explain whether the panels and AB consider and deliberate on the content of an amicus 
curiae submission. This account draws from previous literature that illustrates how 
international adjudication is constrained by law and politics. The third part comprises the 
empirical analysis and explores how well the theoretical account matches how the WTO 
panels and AB have treated amicus submissions. The argument is tested using multivariate 
statistical analysis and qualitative content analysis. The fourth part offers a discussion of the 
findings and its implications. 
 
Amicus Submissions to the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
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A submission by an amicus curiae, or ‘‘friend of the court,” presents an individual or group 
with the opportunity to participate in a dispute by way of contributing factual information and 
legal arguments to the WTO panels and AB. Amici curiae can serve at least three functions: 
(1) provide legal analysis, (2) provide factual evidence and analysis, (3) provide information 
on how the dispute relates to a broader political and social context (Van den Bossche 2008, 
739). 
The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) does not explicitly provide the 
dispute panels or the Appellate Body with the authority to receive and use amicus 
submissions. However, a panel addressed whether or not it had the authority to accept and 
consider an amicus curiae submission in 1998 after receiving two briefs from environmental 
groups in connection with the US – Shrimp dispute.1 The panel found it did not have the 
authority to consider such briefs because they were unsolicited. The panel’s understanding 
was that while Article 13 of the DSU permitted panels to seek information and technical 
advice, such information had to be requested by the panel. Thus, “accepting non-requested 
information from non-governmental sources would be, in our opinion, incompatible with the 
provisions of the DSU…”2 However, the panel did allow for amici to be attached to parties’ 
submissions for consideration, which the US had done with the two briefs. Later when the 
dispute was appealed, the AB disagreed with the panel’s findings, opting for a broader 
interpretation of Article 13. It found that “[a] panel has the discretionary authority either to 
accept and consider or to reject information and advice submitted to it, whether requested by 
the panel or not. The fact that a panel may motu proprio have initiated the request for 
information does not, by itself, bind the panel to accept and consider the information which is 
                                                 
1
 United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Panel. 
WTO/DS58/R, May 15, 1998. 
2
 Ibid., para. 7.8. 
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actually submitted.”3 In addition, the AB affirmed that the panel was entitled to consider the 
amicus which the US had appended to its own submissions. This decision, however, left 
unresolved whether the AB could accept and consider an amicus submission on its own (Stern, 
2005: 1433-1435).  
The AB later decided that it could also accept an amicus brief and take it into account. 
The AB found that Article 17.9 of the DSU accorded the AB with the authority to draw up its 
own working procedures, and thus the AB has “the legal authority to decide whether or not to 
accept and consider any information that [it] believe[s] is pertinent and useful in an appeal.”4 
While asserting its authority to accept and consider an amicus submission, the AB did not 
establish any rules governing when it could make use of this authority. The following year, 
the AB in its review of the Asbestos dispute, adopted a working procedure for the admission 
of amicus curiae briefs.5 While the procedure was only to apply to this dispute and all 
submissions were in the end denied acceptance, it gave way to further integration of amicus 
submissions in the DSM while also leaving unclear when amici could be accepted and 
considered.  
These developments regarding amicus submissions gave rise to a wave of public 
discourse around the AB’s ruling on amicus curiae (Umbricht 2001, 775-76). States reacted 
strongly to the decisions, culminating in a special session of the WTO General Council held 
on November 22, 2000 to discuss the amicus procedure adopted by the AB. During this 
session, states overwhelmingly expressed disapproval with the acceptance of amici (Umbricht 
2001, 776). In later negotiations to reform the DSU, amicus submissions were a source of 
contention between states because they had divergent preferences on whether amici should be 
                                                 
3
 United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body. 
WTO/DS58/AB/R, May 15, 1998, para. 108. 
4
 United States — Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel 
Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate Body. WTO/DS138/AB/R, May 10, 2000, 
para. 39. 
5
 European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, Report of the 
Panel. WTO/DS135/R, September 18, 2000. 
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permitted (Squatrito 2012). State negotiations to reform the DSU never led to a formal change 
to the DSU. Nevertheless, amicus submissions remain controversial, and some states continue 
to openly oppose them.  
The debate surrounding amicus curiae submissions has been multifaceted and the 
arguments varied. Two main threads however can be identified: one concerns the 
consequences of amici for decision-making effectiveness and the other concerns the 
consequences for the WTO DSM’s legitimacy. Proponents of amicus curiae access have 
argued that amicus curiae access can improve decision-making effectiveness by improving the 
quality and diversity of information. Non-state actors have information and resources that 
states lack, and thus their inclusion can ensure decision-making is based on more and better 
information (Esty 1998). Proponents also argue that amicus curiae submissions can help to 
alleviate aspects of the WTO DSM’s legitimacy deficit that arises from its lack of 
transparency and openness to non-state actors. Amicus curiae access enables stakeholders 
other than states to be heard in the WTO DSM, increasing public participation and 
representation of the varying interests that are affected by decisions made through the WTO 
DSM (Charnovitz 2000, Esty 1998). 
 Opponents of access similarly point to concerns of effectiveness of decision-making 
and legitimacy. They argue that amicus submissions diminish the effectiveness of decision-
making by increasing the number of participants which can make coming to decisions more 
cumbersome. Some contend that WTO dispute settlement does, in the absence of amicus 
curiae access, include considerable participation for non-state actors (Dunoff 1998). Others 
argue that legitimacy is not improved by non-state actor involvement because many of these 
actors may be lacking in their own democratic credentials (Trachtman and Moremen 2003) or 
because it does not address the fundamental issue of transparency (Slotboom 2006). Similar 
arguments suggest that amici would weaken the legitimacy of the WTO DSM by leading to an 
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overrepresentation of certain interests and their undue influence on decision-making (Shaffer 
2001). This argument is largely based on the assumption that amici will predominately 
represent the interests of the global North, such as environmentalists and labor, to the 
detriment of the developing world. Accordingly, opponents of amicus submissions argue that 
such non-state actor involvement hinders fairness in the WTO DSM, and rather than promote 
its legitimacy, would diminish it as a consequence of introducing systematic bias in the DSM.  
Both of these general arguments tend to assume that once submitted amicus briefs are 
factored into the deliberation and decision-making of the panels and AB.  However, whether 
this is the case is not clear. A variety of non-state actors, such as environmental NGOs, 
academics, trade unions, public health associations, and industry associations, have continued 
to file submissions to the dispute panels and the AB, despite the controversy surrounding  
amicus curiae at the WTO.  What has come of these amici?  
To address this question, I draw upon an original dataset, covering disputes that have 
been adjudicated by the WTO panels and AB. The dataset comprises all WTO disputes in 
which a panel or AB report has been issued through the end of 2014. The data include 
information on whether an amicus was filed in each dispute before a panel or the AB, as well 
as general dispute characteristics. When an amicus is filed, disputes are coded for the amicus 
characteristics, including name of the organization, whether the amicus is jointly filed by 
more than one organization, the territorial origin of the organization and the type of 
organization.6 The categories for territorial origin and organization type are borrowed from 
Hanegraaff, Beyers, and Braun (2011). In addition, the dataset includes information on how 
the panel and the AB respond to each amicus brief (based on the report’s description of how 
                                                 
6
 Coding on each amicus party is  guided by information recorded in the panel and AB reports, the Yearbook of 
International Organizations, the ECOSOC database, and WTO Ministerial Conference NGO accreditation lists. 
Where information on organization type and territorial origin could not be discerned from these sources, I relied 
on self-representation of amici actors on their webpages . For a few actors, I used other sources.  
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the panel or AB treated the amicus) as well as characteristics of the dispute.  Here I briefly 
describe the general patterns identified by the data. 
Figure 1 illustrates the annual proportion of panel and Appellate Body reports 
involving disputes where at least one amicus submission was received. While there is a slight 
upward trend over time in the portion of disputes in which amici were filed, there is 
considerable variation from year to year. Figure 1 also reveals that in most disputes the panels 
or AB do not receive an amicus submission. During most years, less than 50% of the panel 
and AB reports had at least one amicus submission filed. In this sense, amicus submissions 
are usually the exception, rather than the rule.  Nevertheless, in some years, the proportion of 
disputes with submissions is noteworthy. In total, 21 of 144 (15%) panel reports have 
involved disputes to which there were amici filed. Amici were submitted in seventeen out of 
70 (or 24%) of the disputes reviewed by the Appellate Body where reports were circulated 
through 2014.  Of all disputes brought to the WTO DSM, only 30 had amicus submissions at 
either or both the panel and AB. Moreover, in all but seven of these 30 disputes either the US 
or the European Union was the respondents in the dispute.7  
    
[FIGURE 1 about here] 
 
In total, there have been 98 amicus submissions representing 148 actors.  Some amicus 
actors have filed or joined an amicus in more than one dispute. For example, American Public 
Health Association and Greenpeace International have been repeat filers, submitting amicus 
curiae briefs in more than one dispute. Table 1 illustrates the distribution of amicus actors by 
territorial origin. Most amicus actors are from North America (the US or Canada) and Europe. 
In fact, roughly 68% of all amicus actors come from these two regions. Approximately 20% 
                                                 
7
 See appendix for complete list of disputes in which amicus submissions were received.  
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of all actors on whose behalf an amicus has been filed come from South America, Africa or 
Asia. The territorial origins of amicus actors are as some opponents of access expect: there is 
a disproportionate representation of the global North. However, one should bear in mind that 
the US or the EU were the respondents in most of the disputes in which amici were filed.  
In addition to the territorial origin of amici actors, there is diversity in the types of 
organizations that have filed amici. Table 2 presents the distribution of amici actors by 
organization type. The data confirm there is diversity, and all types of organizations have filed 
amici. NGOs represent the largest proportion of amici actors, followed by business 
organizations and institutes.8 Also, there have been submissions by groups or individuals 
representing both economic and non-economic interests.   
 
[Table 1 and Table 2 about here] 
 
Given this distribution of volume and diversity in amicus curiae submissions, the 
question remains: does submission mean an amicus brief is considered by the WTO panels 
and AB, or is access conditional?  While the panels and AB read all of the amicus 
submissions they receive,9 they do not always address the content of all amicus submissions 
in their deliberation and analysis.  In other words, not all amicus are actively considered.10 
Table 3 summarizes how the WTO panels and AB have treated all submitted amicus briefs, as 
explicitly described by their reports. In most instances the panels or AB do not “take into 
consideration” the content of the submissions in their decisions.  In total, 81.5% of amicus 
submissions were not considered by the panel or AB. While the reasons for not being 
                                                 
8
 Institutes are institutions “without members (companies, individuals, or direct sponsors) and encompass 
organizations such as think-tanks, local government and authorities, and universities” (Hanegraaff, Beyers, and 
Braun 2011, 462, note 11). 
9
 Interview A, WTO Legal Affairs Division Staff Member. Geneva, October 16, 2014. 
10
 I use the term “consider” because it is commonly used by the panels and AB to indicate the content is 
addressed. 
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considered vary, it is most common for the panels or AB to state that the information provided 
by the amici is “not necessary” to consider.11 Amici are generally ruled to be unnecessary to 
consider in one of two situations. First, many of the amici are not considered because, as 
described in the reports, they contain information that is not useful or pertinent to the 
questions before the panel or AB. Second, in other instances amicus submissions are not 
necessary to consider because they do not provide original information. Rather, they repeat 
the information presented in the state parties arguments. 
 
[TABLE 3 about here] 
 
Nonetheless, amicus are accepted and considered in some instances. As Table 3 illustrates, the 
content of 18.5% of amicus submissions are taken into consideration. Thus, it is not common 
for the content of an amicus brief to be openly considered by a panel or the AB.  Figure 1 
above depicts the yearly rate at which amicus submissions are taken into consideration. It 
illustrates that the rate of amicus consideration fluctuates from year to year. There appears to 
be an upward trend toward higher acceptance from 1999 until 2009, but then a decline.  The 
time trend is influenced by 2009, when there was only one amicus submitted that was 
subsequently taken into consideration. Sixteen amicus submissions have formally been 
accepted and considered by panels.  It is especially rare for the AB to consider an amicus brief. 
In fact, the AB has only found one amicus to merit consideration. In all other instances, the 
AB has either rejected the briefs without explanation or found them not necessary to consider. 
How can we explain this pattern of response from the WTO DSM to amicus submissions?  
 
Explaining WTO DSM Acceptance of Amicus Submissions 
                                                 
11
 “Necessary” is the term commonly used by the panels or AB when describing their treatment of amicus briefs.  
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The previous section illustrated that non-state actors do try to engage with the WTO DSM by 
submitting amicus submissions. Nevertheless, not all amici that are submitted are considered 
by the panels of AB. Rather, the WTO DSM’s consideration of amicus submission varies, 
making access conditional. To explain this variation, this section builds on central insights 
from research on international adjudication, positing that a combination of political and legal 
factors condition whether amici submissions are accepted and considered by the WTO panels 
and AB.  
Previous research on international courts and tribunals suggests that international 
adjudicators operate within a complex environment of legal and political constraints 
(Steinberg 2004, Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz 1998, Stone Sweet and Brunell 2013). The 
WTO DSM has been shown to similarly operate under both political and legal constraints 
(Steinberg 2004, McCall Smith 2003, Kelemen 2001). Consequently, adjudicators adopt 
strategic behaviors to accommodate these constraints. First, international adjudicators operate 
within political contexts which constrain their behavior. Adjudicators are politically 
constrained because they have incentives to ensure their judgments are complied with, to 
deter court curbing (or any political action that could undermine the authority of the court or 
tribunal), and to more broadly maintain the court or tribunal’s institutional integrity and 
legitimacy (Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz 1998, Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla 2008, Elsig and 
Pollack 2014, Larsson and Naurin 2016). While international adjudicators are unlikely to 
overtly yield to political pressure (especially from states), they may nonetheless adopt 
strategies in their judicial decision-making that can help to insulate them from political 
pressure, such as using judicial economy (Busch and Pelc 2010). In other words, international 
adjudicators are concerned with their reputation and position vis-à-vis political audiences. 
12 
 
Second, alongside political constraints international adjudicators confront legal 
constraints. Legal constraints include specific legal provisions that limit the discretion of 
adjudicators; that is, the law itself may constrain. Legal constraints can also arise from the 
broader concern of maintaining legal legitimacy. International courts draw legal legitimacy, in 
part, from the professional and moral authority of their judges or adjudicators. Specifically, 
judges have moral authority because they serve higher ideals and based on respect for their 
expertise (Alter 2008). Failures to judge according to law, or to violate ethics of the 
profession, such as fairness and impartiality, could weaken their claim to authority and 
compromise the integrity of the court or tribunal they serve. Thus, in addition to having 
incentives that are shaped by their political audiences, international adjudicators are 
constrained by the law and their position vis-à-vis legal audiences.  
International adjudicators confront a combination of political and legal constraints. I 
posit that the combination of political and legal constraints that international adjudicators face 
can account for the variation in whether the panels and AB take into consideration an amicus 
submission. Specifically, the panels and AB are likely to restrict their acceptance and 
consideration of amici to those that accommodate the legal and political constraints faced by 
the WTO DSM. In the following, I discuss two conditions in particular that are likely to 
enable an amicus to accommodate these constraints.  
 First, to accommodate its political constraints the WTO DSM is more likely to accept 
and consider an amicus when it accords with the preferences of one or more disputing parties. 
As Ginsburg argues, “courts need the support of particular audiences. Sometimes this will be 
a particular state or a set of states powerful enough to insulate the court from attacks and 
pressure” (Ginsburg 2013, 494). Restricting the consideration of an amici to those that accord 
with the preferences of a disputing party enables the panel or AB to shield itself politically by 
aligning itself with the preference of the state(s) that benefits from the amicus submission. In 
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other words, when a disputing party validates the information provided by an amicus, it is less 
politically costly for the panel or AB to actively engage it in its adjudication. 
States make their preferences known to adjudicators through a variety of means. They 
make their preferences known to adjudicators in their written and oral interventions as a direct 
litigating party or as a third party during legal proceedings. Adjudicators can also identify 
state preferences through official statements made in other venues. For example, the WTO’s 
Appellate Body may infer state preferences from what states have stated in meetings of the 
WTO’s General Council or highly visible public fora. Adjudicators might also be able to infer 
state preferences from domestic law and policy, assessing “aggregate state practice in order to 
arrive at some measure of the extent of regime consensus on a relevant policy issue; the 
degree of policy consensus is then treated as an important fact bearing on the case at hand” 
(Stone Sweet and Brunell 2013, 63).  They can look at what portion of states has laws or 
policies that would resemble that which the court would prefer to advance in its decisions. 
However, as amicus submissions have been especially controversial in the WTO, as discussed 
above, the panels and AB are likely to rely upon the expressed preference of a disputing party 
that an amicus be considered, as this provides the most certainty that a disputing party’s 
preferences align with the amicus.  For example, previous research found that the panels and 
AB only address arguments of amicus actors if their briefs were appended to a state’s 
submissions (Dunoff 2006, 660). Appending a brief, however, is only one possible way in 
which a party to the dispute can express a preference that an amicus submission be considered.  
Consequently, we would expect that an amicus curiae brief is more likely to be considered by 
a panel or the AB if a disputing party expressly supports its consideration. 
Second, the panels and AB are more likely to accept and consider an amicus when it 
does not interfere with the WTO DSM’s reputation for coherence. Coherence is the treatment 
of “like cases as alike”, or that rules “be applied uniformly in every ‘similar’ or ‘applicable’ 
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instance” (Franck 1995, 38).12  Coherence therefore depends on the consistent application of 
rules. Maintaining a court’s reputation for coherence is an important way by which 
international adjudicators can boost the legal legitimacy of an international court or tribunal 
(Kelemen 2001, 625), especially in relation to its reputation with legal audiences.  
International adjudicators’ consistent application of the law improves their reputation with 
legal audiences because it increases adherence to the law (Franck 1990). It also advances the 
view that the law is neutral or “fair” (Franck 1995, Dworkin 1986). Thus, to be viewed as 
authoritative interpreters of law, judges aim for coherence in their decision-making (McCall 
Smith 2003, 75). 
If the acceptance and consideration of amicus briefs is conditioned by the panels’ and 
AB’s interests to maintain a reputation for coherence, we would expect the panels and AB to 
treat amicus briefs similarly, in accordance to similar procedures. Consequently, we would 
observe a consistent and principled treatment of amici, and in accordance with the law and 
legal principles. For example, we should find that the territorial origin of the amicus actor 
does not determine whether it is considered. Also, to preserve a reputation for coherence, the 
DSM would most likely refrain from considering amici in their legal analysis, but not 
necessarily in their factual analysis. For this reason, we should find that amicus submissions 
that provide information on the facts of the dispute, not on law, to be more likely to be 
considered.  
If the WTO DSM is constrained by both political and legal concerns, either of these 
conditions alone is unlikely to sufficiently account for how the panels and the AB handle 
amicus curiae briefs. Rather, the best explanatory leverage for whether an amicus submission 
is considered derives from the combination of the two factors. For this reason, we would 
                                                 
12
 Ronald Dworkin (1986) refers to coherence as “integrity.”  
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expect an amicus curiae brief to be accepted and considered only if: (1) it is expressly 
endorsed by a disputing party, and (2) it advances the WTO DSM’s reputation for coherence.   
The combination of political and legal constraints is greater for the Appellate Body 
than the panels, making it less likely that the AB will consider amici. The AB faces greater 
political constraints. As panels are the tribunal of first instance, states can always contest the 
findings of panels by appealing to the AB. The AB decisions, however, can only be reversed 
by political override. Also, the appointment of AB members is political. As Steinberg 
explains, “…Appellate Body members are selected through a process in which powerful 
members may veto candidates whom they assess as likely to engage in inappropriate or 
undesired lawmaking; the Appellate Body acts in the shadow of threats to rewrite DSU rules 
that would weaken it and of possible defiance of its decisions by powerful members; and the 
Appellate Body receives-and has established means of obtaining- information on the 
preferences of powerful members, helping it to avoid political pitfalls. Hence, WTO legal 
discourse has been applied in a manner that pays attention to political signals, and the 
Appellate Body's interpretations generally rest within the interstices of WTO texts” (Steinberg 
2004, 274).  Also, the AB most likely treats amicus submissions in light of its past experience 
of backlash by states. Thus, the AB is in a more politically precarious position when it comes 
to amicus submissions than the panels.  
Moreover, the AB has legal constraints that the panels do not, reducing the likelihood 
that it will accept and consider amicus submissions. The AB does not rule on factual 
arguments but only on rulings of law (Marceau and Hurley 2012, 30). Consequently, 
information provided by an amicus that would ordinarily assist in a factual determination is 
legally constrained from consideration by the AB. Amicus actors do not necessarily know that 
the AB makes only legal determinations, and they might submit factual information regardless, 
causing their submission to fall outside the realm of what the AB can legal consider. Also, the 
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AB’s reputation with legal audiences could suffer from relying on non-legal authorities for 
legal arguments. As the political and legal constraints are greater for the AB than the panels, 
we would expect the AB to be less likely to accept and consider amicus submissions. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
 In this section, I illustrate how the theoretical expectations stand up empirically using 
mixed-methods. The empirical analysis builds on the original dataset presented above, which 
includes all disputes adjudicated by the WTO panels and AB through the end of 2014. I test 
the theoretical expectations through multivariate statistical analysis first. A qualitative content 
analysis of the panel and AB reports, as well as interview material, then follows to 
complement the statistical analysis. A mixed methods approach is necessary because there is 
relatively small number of amicus submissions for large N analysis. The qualitative analysis 
fills gaps in the quantitative analysis, while also adding nuance and content to the analysis. 
Overall, the empirical analysis shows that state endorsement of an amicus as well as WTO 
DSM’s interests to secure its reputation for coherence in adjudication condition whether 
amicus briefs are considered by the WTO dispute settlement system.  
 
Multivariate Analysis 
To test what determines whether an amicus submission is taken into consideration by 
the WTO DSM, I begin with a binomial logistic regression, with standard errors clustered by 
dispute because some disputes have been subject to more than one amicus submission. The 
unit of analysis is the amicus submission. The dependent variable considered is a binary 
measure of whether the panel or AB report states that it took into consideration, at least in part, 
the amicus submission. I test the effect of three key factors on the dependent variable.  First, I 
test the effect of territorial origin and organization type of the actors who file the amicus 
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submission. These are measured as dummy variables for each territorial origin and 
organization type. The theoretical expectation for legal coherence is that the territorial origin 
should not determine the likelihood an amicus is considered.  Also, if legal coherence is a 
constraint, organization type should not affect consideration, with the exception of institutes.13 
Factual information is the least likely to interfere with legal coherence and among 
organizations types, institutes are the most likely to provide factual information. Thus, amicus 
submissions from institutes, as opposed to all other types of organizations, are more likely to 
be considered. 
[TABLE 4 here] 
A cross-tabulation of the rate at which amicus are considered by their territorial origin 
and organization type seems to correspond to these expectations. Table 5 illustrates there are 
few strong tendencies for amicus consideration to be associated with amici of a particular 
territorial origin or organization type. The territorial origin of amicus actors appears to have 
little bearing on their acceptance. While amicus briefs from Asia, Oceania, and South 
America have not been considered, this is driven in part by the few amicus submitted from 
these regions. Also, organization types have similar rates of consideration, with the exception 
of business or industry associations. At the same time, of amicus actors for which the type is 
known, institutes have the highest rates of acceptance.  
The multivariate analysis also tests the effect of expressed support, measured as 
whether a direct party to the dispute claims that the amicus should be considered by the panel 
or AB or that the panel or AB has the authority to consider amici. This variable is coded based 
on the panel and AB reports’ description of the parties’ position on the amicus. It does not 
capture whether the party incorporates the substantive content of the amicus into its own 
                                                 
13
 Most of the amicus actors coded as institutes are universities.  
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submission, but rather it captures statements of general support for the amicus to be 
considered by panel or AB.  
Two controls are included in the analysis. First, previous literature suggests that the 
more third parties there are to a dispute the more politically salient or contentious the dispute 
is (Busch and Reinhardt 2006). For this reason, I control for the number of third parties. 
Second, there is possibility that the treatment of amicus has evolved over time. To account for 
this, I include a variable that captures a time trend.  
 
[TABLE 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 presents the results of this analysis in five models. Models 1 and 2 look at the 
effect of expressed support and institute without controls. Models 3 and 4 include the controls, 
and Model 5 provides a full model. An amicus receiving the expressed support of a disputing 
party has a strong positive and statistically significantly effect on the likelihood that an 
amicus is considered. Similarly, whether the amicus filer is an institute has a positive, 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood the content of the amicus is considered. These 
results are robust across models.  Expressed support increases the likelihood an amicus will be 
considered by approximately 47%, all else constant. 14 If an amicus is submitted by an 
institute, the likelihood it is considered increases by 33%, all else constant. I have speculated 
that institutes are more successful in having their amici considered because they probably 
provide more factual evidence than legal arguments. I however have not directly examined 
the content of their submissions to know if this is the case.15 This finding raises an important 
question for future research: are institutes’ submissions focused on factual evidence?  
                                                 
14
 Model 5 is used to estimate the marginal effects. 
15
 Amicus submissions are not publicly available, with the exception of those that are made available by the 
amicus actors themselves. Consequently, I do not have access to institutes’ submissions to systematically 
analyze them. 
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All organization types, with the exception of institutes, are not significant in any of the 
models, suggesting they do not explain the likelihood of amicus consideration.  Also, the 
territorial origin of the amicus filer in the aggregate does not account for the likelihood an 
amicus is considered.  In model 4, North American and African amicus filers have a positive, 
statistically significant effect on amicus consideration. These results, however, are not robust, 
and model 4 does not provide the best fit to the data.  More importantly, there is no strong 
theoretical reason to think that amicus actors from these two regions will be more likely to 
have their submissions considered. Overall, these results suggest that the territorial origin an 
amicus actor does not influence whether an amicus is likely to be considered. 
Finally, the controls are not significant in any of the models. This suggests that there is 
no underlying effect of time on the likelihood that an amicus is considered. Also, there is no 
statistically significant effect of the number of third parties to the dispute on the likelihood 
that an amicus is considered.   
A qualitative analysis complements the multivariate analysis in three important ways. 
First, the qualitative evidence further specifies how endorsement shapes whether an amicus is 
considered.  Second, the qualitative evidence adds robustness to the quantitative evidence 
concerning legal coherence. Third, the statistically analysis cannot examine the effect of 
whether the amicus filed to the Appellate Body are less likely to be considered because of 
insufficient variation. The qualitative analysis addresses the expectations with regards to the 
AB and illustrates that amicus consideration is exceedingly rare in disputes before the AB.  
 
 
Accepting amici when endorsed by states 
 The multivariate analysis shows that whether an amicus is considered is influence by 
whether a disputing party gives a generic statement supporting the consideration of the amicus 
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by the panel or AB.  A qualitative assessment of this relationship reveals that a more robust 
form of endorsement is actually necessary for the content of amicus submission to be 
considered. In fact, amici are only considered when the content or arguments of amici are 
incorporated into the submissions of state parties. This occurs in one of two ways. First, amici 
have been considered by the panel if the content of the amicus submission is also presented in 
the written submissions or oral arguments of a party to the dispute.  For example, in EC – 
Salmon (Norway) the panel stated: “Having considered the views expressed by the parties and 
third parties, the Panel concluded that it would consider views expressed in the unsolicited 
submissions to the extent that parties decided to adopt the views expressed therein in their 
own submissions and arguments to the Panel.”16  Similar assertions were made by the panels 
in several instances, suggesting that the panels accept and use an amicus submission only if a 
state illustrates that it agrees with the content of the submission. 
 Second, the panels have considered the content of an amicus brief when a state party 
has appended the brief to its own submissions. This has occurred with only seven amicus 
briefs, all of which entailed the respondent state entering the amicus into its submission as an 
exhibit or by making explicit reference to an amicus submission in their own submissions. 
The former occurred in EC – Asbestos, when the EC appended the amicus submissions of the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations’ brief and the brief 
by the Collegium Ramazzini. The panel stated that it would take these two briefs into account, 
“as they had been included by the EC in their own submissions on an equal footing.”17 The 
other four instances of an amicus briefs being appended to the respondent’s brief were in US – 
Shrimp, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, EC – Seal Products, and US — Tuna II.   
                                                 
16
 European Communities — Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway WTO/DS337/R, 
November 17, 2006, para. 1.13.  
17
 European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, Report of the 
Panel. WTO/DS135/R, September 18, 2000, para. 8.12). 
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 In some instances, states have said that they support aspects of the amicus or say that 
they think that some of the information in an amicus is likely to be of assistance to the panel. 
Yet, it is not sufficient for states to explain that they agree with only some aspects of an 
amicus. In US — Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, “The United States 
confirmed that the brief was not a part of the official submission of the United States, but that 
the United States agreed with much, although not all, of the brief,” and the panel decided to 
not to take into account the brief filed by the American Iron and Steel Institute.18  In other 
words, a participating state must be willing to embrace and endorse all aspects of the 
submission for the amicus to be considered by the panel in its findings. This presents a 
relatively high bar for amicus submissions to be accepted and considered. In other words, the 
content of an amicus submission is only openly considered by the DSM when a disputing 
party endorses the contributions made by the amicus.  The practice of only considering an 
amicus if it is endorsed by a disputing party enables the panels to shield itself behind the 
position of the endorsing state. 
 
Coherence: Procedural fairness and factual information 
A review of the panels’ and AB’s treatment of amicus submissions is also guided by a 
consistent and principled treatment of amici, reflecting their interest in maintaining a 
reputation with legal audiences for coherence. The multivariate analysis shows that amicus 
actors’ territorial origin and organization type, with the exception of institutes, actors does not 
account for the likelihood an amicus is considered. Content analysis reveals that the WTO 
DSM demonstrates an interest in preserving the WTO DSM’s reputation for coherence 
through the consistent application of two principles. First, the panels and AB consistently 
apply standards of procedural fairness in determining whether to accept an amicus. As an 
                                                 
18
 United States — Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities, 
Report of the Panel, WTO/DS212/R. July 31, 2002, para. 76.  
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interviewee confirms, panels have discretion with regards to considering amicus briefs, 
provided they respect the due process rights of state parties.19 A principled approach based on 
procedural fairness has led panels to consistently reject amicus submissions that are received 
too late in the dispute settlement process. “Panels and the Appellate Body now tend to accept 
unsolicited amicus briefs, provided that they are submitted within a reasonable time frame. If 
they are presented once the first substantive meeting has started, they risk being disregarded” 
(Marceau and Hurley 2012, 31).  
 The practice of not accepting late submissions was initiated by the panel in US – Lead 
and Bismuth II in 1999. The panel received a submission from the American Iron and Steel 
Institute in July 1999. While the panel recognized its authority to accept and consider such 
submissions, the panel stated: “we chose not to exercise that authority as a result of the late 
submission of the brief. The AISI brief was submitted after the deadline for the parties’ 
rebuttal submissions, and after the second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties. 
Thus, the parties have not, as a practical matter, had adequate opportunity to present their 
comments on the AISI brief to the Panel. In our view, the inability of the parties to present 
their comments on the AISI brief raises serious due process concerns as to the extent to which 
the Panel could consider the brief.”20 The following year, the panel in EC – Asbestos also 
rejected an amicus due to the timing of its submission. Among other amicus submissions, the 
panel received one brief by the non-governmental organization ONE ("Only Nature Endures") 
in June 2000. This was several months following the second substantive meeting of the panel 
with the parties held in January 2000, which is when parties present their rebuttal arguments. 
The panel decided to not accept the brief as it “had been submitted at a stage in the procedure 
                                                 
19
 Interview A, WTO Legal Affairs Division Staff Member. Geneva, October 16, 2014. 
20
 United States — Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel 
Products Originating in the United Kingdom WT/DS138/R. Report of the Panel, December 23, 1999, para. 6.3.  
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when it could no longer be taken into account.”21 Other amici briefs were rejected by the 
panels explicitly due to their tardiness. This occurred in two panels in 2006 – US – Soft 
Lumber III and EC – Selected Customs Matters. The panels have been consistent in applying 
this approach. Even as recently as EC – Seal Products, an amicus was rejected on the basis of 
its tardiness. Table 1 shows approximately fifteen percent of amici are rejected on grounds of 
timing.  
 Applying a principled approach based on procedural fairness has also led the panels 
and AB to consistently invite the parties to a dispute to respond to amicus submissions and 
give them the opportunity to express their views on the submissions. As one member of the 
legal affairs division claimed, it is regular practice to circulate any amicus that is received to 
the parties and for the panel to then ask the parties for their views on whether the amicus 
should be taken into account as well as provide any comments they have on the content of the 
submission.22 These invitations extend to the third parties as well as the direct parties.   
As McCall Smith (2003) has argued, an important means by which the WTO DSM has 
been able to ensure its reputation for coherence is through its establishment and application of 
procedural rules in its decision-making. Given this underlying context in which amici are 
viewed as a potential source of unfairness, the panels and AB application of procedural 
fairness to amicus submission is not entirely surprising. As Mavroidis  argued, in addressing 
amicus briefs, “due process considerations can help to ensure that there will be no undue 
advantage conferred to any party” (2002, 11). Nevertheless, this analysis empirically confirms 
this to be the case, and suggests that it serves the broader interests of the WTO DSM, vis-a-vis 
legal audiences, to demonstrate a principled and consistent approach to dealing with amici.  
Second, amicus submissions are considered only in relation to the panels’ factual 
analysis. The panels have consistently excluded from consideration any legal arguments 
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 European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos WT/DS135/R. 
Report of the Panel, September 18, 2000, para. 8.14. 
22
 Interview A, WTO Legal Affairs Division Staff Member. Geneva, October 16, 2014. 
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offered by amicus briefs. For example, in the US – Tuna II, the panel received an amicus brief 
jointly submitted by the Humane Society International and the American University’s 
Washington College of Law.  The US “requested the Panel to review and consider the 
submission in its deliberations, in light of the relevant and useful information it contained 
which it believed could assist the Panel in understanding the issues in this dispute.”23 The US 
cited the amicus in its opening statement as well as in its responses to the panel. The US 
argued consumer preferences motivated the US policy on dolphin-safe labelling of tuna. In 
developing this argument, the US cited the amicus brief to illustrate how consumer 
preferences in the US were determined by the method of fishing for tuna.24  The panel also 
cited the amicus submission in the reasoning of its findings. Specifically, along with other 
factual information, the panel referred to the amicus in determining whether the dolphin-safe 
labelling provisions created a technical barrier that discriminated against the import of 
Mexican tuna in the US. The amicus brief was used to support the conclusion that consumer 
sentiment and preferences contributed to the US regulations on dolphin-safe labelling and 
limited the marketability of non-dolphin safe Mexican tuna in the US.  As the panel stated, 
“the paragraphs of the amicus curiae brief to which the United States refer and the exhibits 
attached to the brief quoted in such paragraphs support the conclusion that such policies were 
prompted by the lobbying exerted by environmentalists rather than by the enactment of the 
DPCIA itself.”25 
 Similarly, the panel in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres considered an amicus by the Humane 
Society International, which provided factual information concerning the effects of emissions 
from tire fires and the accumulation of waste tires on animal and plant life or health. The 
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 United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 
Report of the Panel, WTO/DS381/R, September 15, 2011. Para. VII.3.  
24
 Ibid, para. VII.3. 
25
 Ibid., para. VII.83. 
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amicus was incorporated into Brazil’s official submissions by attaching it as an exhibit.26 In 
its argumentation, Brazil referred to the factual information provided by the brief, to support 
its claim that the restrictions on the trade of retreaded tires were necessary to protect human 
and plant life and health. Similarly, an amicus submission by a group of NGOs was important 
to the reasoning of the panel in EC – Seal Products.27 The panel cited the amicus in its 
findings, when determining whether seal products derived from indigenous hunts and for 
resource management purposes were significantly different from commercial hunting, which 
were prohibited by the EU’s Seals Regime and constituted most of Canadian and Norwegian 
seal hunts. Among other things, the amici were cited by the panel in determining whether 
commercial hunts were unlike indigenous or resource management hunts in terms of animal 
welfare and humane killings.28 Drawing on amici for the purpose of making factual 
determinations, as opposed to legal determinations, is a principle that the WTO panels has 
consistently applied.  
 
Appellate Body and Amicus Submissions 
The panels and the AB respond quite differently to amicus submissions.  The 
multivariate analysis illustrated that an amicus brief submitted to the AB is less likely to be 
considered than those submitted to the panel.  In only one instance has the AB stated that an 
amicus merits some consideration. Specifically, in EC – Sardines the AB found that the 
amicus submitted by the government of Morocco presented an original legal argument.29 
Ultimately, the AB found that this submission was not necessary to consider, but this was the 
closest the AB has come to taking an amicus into account. This in itself was a unique case 
                                                 
26
 Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Report of the Panel. WTO/DS332/R June 12, 2007. 
27
 Interview C, Amicus filer, Geneva, October 18, 2014. 
28
 European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, Report of 
the Panel. WTO/DS400/R; WTO/DS401/R. November 25, 2013. 
29
 European Communities — Trade Description of Sardines, Report of the Appellate Body. WTO/DS231/AB/R, 
September 26, 2002. 
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because the amicus was a member state of the WTO. In all other instances, the AB has 
refrained from officially taking into account the arguments presented to it by amici.  
The fact that the AB does not consider amicus briefs is a consequence of its political 
and legal constraints being greater compared to the panels. First, the AB is in a more 
precarious position vis-à-vis states, and the AB most likely treats amicus submissions in light 
of its past experience of backlash by states.30 The AB’s treatment of amicus submission in EC 
– Asbestos generated intense dissatisfaction on the part of several member states, manifesting 
in special session of the General Council as well as influencing the appointment of the 
members of the AB (Elsig and Pollack 2014, 405). Second, the AB’s treatment of amicus 
submissions is also the result of legal constraints the panels do not face. Specifically, the AB 
does not make rulings on the factual claims of a dispute.  Article 17(6) of the DSU restricts 
the AB’s legal authority to only questions of law, not fact.  To consider amicus submissions 
for the purpose of factual analysis would be an obvious infringement of this provision. 
Moreover, drawing on an amicus for the legal analysis could potentially harm the AB’s 
reputation with legal communities because it would suggest that the AB did not have 
sufficient capacity itself to interpret the law or that it was unduly influenced by non-legal 
authorities. Overall, the combination of political and legal constraints makes the threshold for 
consideration higher for an amicus submission to the AB than to the panels. As a result, the 
AB has to a very minimal extent accepted amicus curiae submissions.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
30
 One interviewee confirmed that the AB most likely did keep past experience in mind when it receives an 
amicus. Interview B, WTO Legal Affairs Division Staff Member. Geneva, October 18, 2014. 
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This article has aimed to map amicus participation in the WTO DSM, and to explain when the 
panels and AB are likely to take an amicus curiae brief into consideration. The analysis has 
two main findings. First, the mapping of amicus submissions shows that the WTO DSM 
amicus briefs are filed in a relatively small portion of disputes – both for the panels and for 
the AB. Amicus actors are also diverse, coming from most world regions and are filed by all 
types of organizations – albeit to varying degrees. Moreover, when they are filed, there are 
rarely accepted and considered. In other words, access is highly conditional.   
Second, this article shows that acceptance and consideration of an amicus curiae brief 
depends on the satisfaction of two conditions, one shaped by political constraints and the 
other by legal constraints. First, the amicus must be endorsed by a state party to the dispute.  
States endorse amicus briefs either by appending them or duplicating the information 
presented by the amicus. Second, the acceptance and consideration of an amicus must accord 
with the WTO DSM’s reputation for coherence. Demonstrating the WTO DSM will treat 
amicus similarly and according to the same principles is important to ensuring that legal 
audiences view it as a legitimate legal authority. The WTO DSM has applied two principles 
consistently to its treatment of amicus curiae submissions: their consideration must not 
undermine fairness to the disputing parties, and they can be used for factual, but not legal, 
analysis. In addition, the article finds that the combination of political and legal constraints 
also makes it very unlikely that amicus briefs will be taken into consideration by the 
Appellate Body.  
These findings advance our understanding of amicus in the WTO beyond what 
previous literature suggested. First, the data reveals that contrary to some early speculations 
there is more diversity among the amici filers than previously thought. Amicus submissions 
come from actors of various regions of the world and from different types of organizations. 
This is not simply about the access and participation of NGOs and environmental 
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organizations from the global North. Second, it confirms previous findings that the panels and 
AB address amicus briefs that are supported by a party to the dispute (Dunoff 2006, 660). 
Although I have found that there is more nuance to how states express support for or endorse 
an amicus, the pattern has largely persisted.31 The fact that this pattern holds not only 
confirms that the WTO DSM is politically constrained, but that political backlash has some 
sustaining power to constrain in the long-run. In other words, the institutional memory for the 
early response of states to amicus briefs is long.  
 Third, early research on amicus submissions posited that principles of procedural 
fairness would apply to how the WTO DSM entertains the briefs (for example, Mavroidis 
2002). This article shows empirically that procedural fairness does indeed play a role in how 
amicus are processed. This is an important finding because it illustrates that not all aspects of 
how the WTO DSM responds to amicus can be understood through political constraints. 
Instead, we see that coherence, which is commonly understood as a cornerstone to the rule of 
law and legitimate legal authority does guide the treatment of amicus submissions. Moreover, 
the commitment to coherence, as seen through the application of a principle of procedural 
fairness, occurs prior to the question of whether or not a party endorses the amicus. In other 
words, concerns for the WTO DSM’s reputation for coherence appears to affect the decision 
of whether to accept an amicus, while endorsement relates more to the question of the content 
is taken into consideration.  
These finding provide both good and bad news for non-state actor involvement.  For 
those who view amicus access as a detriment to the WTO dispute settlement system, this 
analysis is good news. It suggests that there is generally a high threshold to be met before an 
amicus is accepted and considered by the WTO DSM. It also reveals that the most 
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 Dunoff stated that consideration only occurred when an amicus was appended to a party’s submissions. I find 
that appending an amicus is only way in which endorsement occurs. Endorsement also occurs when a party 
duplicates information in their own submissions. This distinction is important because the latter is a way of 
selecting in only certain parts on an amicus, while the former is an endorsement of the amicus in its entirety.    
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controversial aspect of the DSM’s work, legal interpretation is largely unaffected by non-state 
actor involvement. To date, amicus curiae submissions have only been expressly considered 
on the basis of the factual information provided.  
For those who view amicus submissions as a much needed means of participation in 
the WTO, this analysis is perhaps bad news. The article has shown that acceptance and 
consideration of an amicus is quite exceptional and conditional on satisfying both the political 
and legal constraints faced by the panels and AB. The relatively high threshold for access, in 
terms of actually being included in how a legal dispute is adjudicated, means that the formal 
ability to access the panels and the AB rarely translates into participation. Thus, for the 
proponent of non-state actors’ involvement, amicus access holds limited promise for 
participation.  
The article has implications beyond the WTO DSM. Increasingly scholars have 
studied the opening up of global governance to non-state actors, both across the WTO’s 
different organs and in other international organizations (Tallberg et al. 2013, O'Brien et al. 
2000, Hanegraaff et al. 2015, Steffek, Kissling, and Nanz 2008). This article adds to this 
literature, suggesting that even though access may be formally granted to non-state actors, in 
practice it may be conditional. For example, this article has shown that not all actors who take 
advantage of access privileges receive access in the end. Moreover, these findings suggest that 
the conditionality of access might contribute to whether access translates into non-state actors’ 
participation and influence. As this paper has shown, the conditionality of access for amici 
can be viewed as good news for those who are concerned that it allows for the undue 
influence of special interests but also bad news for those who view it as a promise for greater 
participation in global governance. 
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Figure 1. Annual proportion of panel and Appellate Body reports with amici and yearly 
rates of amicus consideration 
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Table 1. Territorial origin of actors who filed amici (N = 148)  
 
Territorial origin Percentage of all amici actors 
Africa 2.70% 
Asia 6.76 
Europe 30.41 
N. America 37.84 
Oceania 2.03 
S. America 10.81 
Unknown 9.46 
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Table 2. Organization type of actors who filed amici (N = 148) 
Organization type Percentage of all amici actors 
Business 21.62% 
Labor 5.41 
NGO 44.59 
Institute 12.16 
Individual 8.78 
unknown 7.43 
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Table 3. Panel and Appellate Body Responses to Amicus Submissions 
 
Type of Response Percent of Amicus 
Not considered 81.5% 
Reason:  Reason is not expressed by panel or AB  30.4% 
 
 Rejected on grounds that the panel/AB 
deems it unnecessary to consider  33.7 
  Rejected on grounds of timing 15.2 
  Other 2.2 
Considered  18.5 
N=92. An addition six amicus submission were coded as having an unknown response by the 
panel or AB. 
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Table 4. Rate Amici are Considered by Territorial Origin and Organization Type 
 
Territorial origin of 
amici 
Percent 
considered 
N Organization type of 
amici  
Percent 
considered 
N 
Africa 25.00% 4 Business 2.86% 35 
Asia 0.00 10 Labor 25.00 4 
Europe 17.65 17 NGO 25.00 16 
N. America 21.21 33 Institute 33.33 6 
Oceania 0.00 2 Individual 20.00 10 
S. America 0.00 6 unknown 36.36 11 
unknown 28.57 14 more than one type 20.00 10 
more than one region 33.33 6    
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Table 5. Binomial Logistic Regression of Amicus Consideration 
Note: Standard errors are clustered by dispute (in parentheses).  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Expressed support 2.391* 
(1.09) 
 4.236* 
(1.88) 
 3.954* 
(1.85) 
Institute  1.872** 
(0.69) 
 3.046** 
(1.17) 
2.898* 
(1.24) 
Europe   1.386 
(1.06) 
1.085 
(0.86) 
1.257 
(0.96) 
N America   1.185 
(0.72) 
1.886** 
(0.68) 
1.412 
(0.73) 
Africa   2.863 
(1.50) 
2.163* 
(0.91) 
2.115 
(1.19) 
S America   0.525 
(1.26) 
0.159 
(1.20) 
0.909 
(1.41) 
NGO   2.673 
(1.74) 
1.381 
(0.82) 
3.024 
(2.00) 
Labor    1.603 
(1.28) 
1.552 
(1.22) 
2.101 
(1.59) 
Individual    3.571 
(2.03) 
1.870 
(1.39) 
3.921 
(2.22) 
Third parties   0.040 
(0.06) 
0.046 
(0.06) 
0.021 
(0.08) 
Time trend   -0.071 
(0.07) 
-0.029 
(0.06) 
-0.034 
(0.08) 
Constant -2.140** 
(0.76) 
-1.872*** 
(0.53) 
-5.529** 
(2.12) 
-4.459*** 
(1.36) 
-6.084* 
(2.45)  
N 92 81 78 78 78 
AIC 0.838 0.879 0.841 1.004 0.831   
Log likelihood -36.539 -33.609 -21.799 -28.152 -20.410 
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Appendix: Disputes in which at least one amicus curiae submission 
Case Name (short title) Dispute Number Date of report  Number 
of amici 
Panel   
US — Shrimp 58 15 May 1998 2 
US — Lead and Bismuth II 138 23 December 1999 1 
EC — Asbestos 135 18 September 2000 5 
EC — Bed Linen 141 30 October 2000 1 
US — Section 110(5) Copyright Act 160 15 June 2000 1 
US — Softwood Lumber III 236 27 September 2002 4 
US — Softwood Lumber IV 257 29 August 2003 3 
US — Softwood Lumber VI 277 22 March 2004 1 
EC — Export Subsidies on Sugar 265, 266, 283 15 October 2004 1 
US — Zeroing (EC) 294 31 October 2005  
EC — Selected Customs Matters 315 16 June 2006 1 
EC —Biotech Products 291, 292, 293 29 September 2006 3 
Brazil — Retreaded Tyres 332 12 June 2007 2 
EC — Salmon (Norway) 337 16 November 2007 3 
EC— Large Civil Aircraft 316 30 June 2010 1 
Australia — Apples 367 9 August 2010 1 
Thailand — Cigarettes (Philippines) 371 15 November 2010 1 
US — Tuna II (Mexico)  381 15 September 2011 1 
US — COOL 384, 386 18 November 2011 1 
Canada — Renewable Energy  412, 426 19 December 2012 2 
EC — Seal Products  400, 401 25 November 2013 5 
 
Appellate Body 
   
US — Lead and Bismuth II 138 10 May 2000 2 
Thailand — H-Beams 122 12 March 2001 1 
EC — Asbestos 135 12 March 2001 31 
EC — Sardines 231 26 September 2002 2 
US — Countervailing Measures on 
Certain EC Products 
212 9 December 2002 1 
US — Steel Safeguards 248, 249, 251, 252, 
253, 254, 258, 259 
10 November 2003 1 
US — Softwood Lumber IV 257 19 January 2004 2 
EC — Export Subsidies on Sugar 265, 266, 283 28 April 2005 1 
EC — Chicken Cuts 269, 286 12 September 2005 1 
Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks 308 6 March 2006 1 
Brazil — Retreaded Tyres 332 3 December 2007 2 
China — Auto Parts 339, 340, 342 15 December 2008 1 
US — Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) 
379 11 March 2011 1 
US — Clove Cigarettes 406 4 April 2012 2 
US — Tuna II (Mexico) 381 16 May 2012 3 
Canada — Renewable Energy 412, 426 6 May 2013 2 
EC — Seal Products 400, 401 22 May 2014 3 
 
